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AnAlternativeGenealogy forGlobalCapitalism:
TheRhineBecomes an InlandSea,1792^1815
James Livesey, Scottish Centre for Global History, University of Dundee
ABSTRACT
This article argues that the change that opened the door to a capitalist world, one
dominated by capitalist norms, was the alteration to the boundary between eco-
nomic and public power that followed the era of the democratic revolution and
in particular the French Revolution. There is consensus of the institutional creativ-
ity fostered by the resistance to Louis XIV. The role of the French Revolution and
the Congress settlement in fostering capitalist innovation has not attracted the same
attention. This article advances the view that the Congress settlement transposed
the political universalism of the Revolution into an economic register. The article
focuses on the evolution of the international legal regime regulating trade on the
Rhine to illuminate the genealogy of capitalist universalism.
W hat was the cumulative effect of the revolutionary era from 1776 tothe Congress of Vienna on economic institutions and economic life?A series of metrics indicate a shift in the global economy after 1815
toward to a new economic regime dominated by theNorthAtlantic littoral.1 Growth
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the reviewers.
1. Christopher A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 69–125; Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making
of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jurgen Oesterhammel, The
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rates in countries around the Atlantic began to rise and compound themselves an-
nually. Prices of a set of basic commodities became globally integrated.2 The slave
economy complex in the American South intensified as the Atlantic economy ex-
panded.3 The connection between political moment and economic effect is widely
acknowledged. Economic historians such as Findlay and O’Rourke and the diplo-
matic historian Paul Schroeder all agree that the congress system created stability
in the North Atlantic littoral and that was the precondition for the moment of he-
gemony.4 O’Rourke andWilliamson further argue that 1815 initiated the first global
capitalist century of the gold standard, lowered costs of transport, industrial emula-
tion, and political hegemony of European empires.5 The key feature of this moment,
in all accounts, is that capitalist institutions extended beyond their particular nations
of origin to become international.
This article explores the genealogy of new international capitalist institutions
across the revolutionary decades. There are robust arguments for the importance
of exogenous events and processes, primarily political, to the emergence of funda-
mental capitalist institutions from the Middle Ages until the present day. The de
Roovers and Lopez, and currently Fredona and Reinert, argue that the institution
of the firm, with its attendant technologies, was created in the context of the self-
assertion of the Italian city-states, primarily Florence, in the thirteenth century.6
North and Weingast argue that the English Glorious Revolution of 1688 created
2. Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “When Did Globalisation Begin?,” European Review of
Economic History 6, no. 1 (April 2002): 23–50; Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Path Dependence, Time
Lags and the Birth of Globalisation: A Critique of O’Rourke andWilliamson,” European Review of Economic His-
tory 8, no. 1 (2004): 81–108; Kevin H. O’Rourke, “The Economist and Global History,” in The Prospect of Global
History, ed. James Belich, John Darwin, Margret Frenz, and Chris Wickham (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016), 44–63.
3. Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A New History of Global Capitalism (London: Harvard University Press,
2014); Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 2013); Barry W. Higman, Plantation Jamaica, 1750–1850: Capital and Control in a Co-
lonial Economy (Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 2005); Richard Follett, The Sugar
Masters: Planters and Slaves in Louisiana’s Cane World, 1820–1860 (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press,
2005); Sven Beckert and Seth Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American Economic Devel-
opment (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).
4. Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War and the World Economy in the Second
Millennium (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European
Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
5. Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-
Century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
6. Raymond de Roover, “A Florentine Firm of Cloth Manufacturers,” Speculum: A Journal of Medieval
Studies 16, no. 1 (1941): 3–33, and The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397–1494 (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1963); Robert S. Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950–1350 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Sophus Reinert and Robert Fredona, “Merchants and the Or-
igins of Capitalism” (Harvard Business School Working Paper 18-021, 2017).
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the political institutions that guaranteed security, or even domination, for economic
elites, and so created the conditions for the first capitalist society.7 They idealize
secure contract as the core driver of the financial revolution and growth in Britain,
although this argument is highly contested by scholars who argue for the develop-
mental role of the state or, alternatively, the importance of empire in creating a
“Britishmodel.”8 Increasingly the normativity of the British path, and of its intellec-
tual reconstructions, are also contested.9 However, there is consensus on the insti-
tutional creativity generated by the resistance to the hegemony of Louis XIV and the
importance of those innovations to the financial revolution.10 There is no compara-
ble debate around the political institutions that emerged from the revolutionary de-
cades a hundred years later. Despite the scale of economic change and the global na-
ture of postrevolutionary capitalism, the political and intellectual work that went
into creating transnational institutions has not been a topic of research.
This article focuses on a particular phenomenon, the evolution of the interna-
tional legal regime regulating trade on the Rhine, as a case study in the creation
of the global institutions that framed and enabled global capitalist development. In-
stitutions coordinate action and lower transaction costs.11 International institutions
are the most difficult to understand because they cannot rely on the enforcement
7. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitments: Evolution of Institu-
tions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” Journal of Economic History 49 (1989):
803–22. The argument is generalized in Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The
Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (London: Profile Books, 2012), 182–212.
8. Steve Pincus and James Robinson, “What Really Happened during the Glorious Revolution?”
(NBER Working Paper 17206, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, July 2011); Steve
Pincus, 1688: The First Modern Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); Julian Hoppit,
“Compulsion, Compensation and Property Rights in Britain 1688–1830,” Past and Present 210 (2011):
93–127; Sophus Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy (Cambridge, MA:
HarvardUniversity Press, 2011); Eric Reinert, “TheRoleof the State inEconomicGrowth,” Journal of Economic
Studies 26, no. 415 (1999): 268–326; JoGuldi,Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press 2012).
9. Jeff Horn, The Path Not Taken: French Industrialization in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1830 (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2006); Alessandro Stanziani, Rules of Exchange: French Capitalism in Comparative Perspective,
Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Peter Hall and
David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001); Roy B. Wong, “China before Capitalism,” in Neal and Williamson, Cambridge His-
tory of Capitalism, Volume 1, 125–64.
10. Patrick Karl O’Brien, “The Formation of States and Transitions to Modern Economies: England,
Europe, and Asia Compared,” in Neal and Williamson, Cambridge History of Capitalism, Volume 1, 357–402.
11. Foundational work on historical institutionalism includes Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,”
Economica 4, no. 16 (1937): 386–405; Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms,
Markets, Relational Contracting (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985); Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional
Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), andUnderstanding the Pro-
cess of Economic Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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mechanism of the state, which guarantees domestic institutions. A key feature of
international institutions therefore is their capacity to create legitimacy for interests
through the establishment of norms.12 The settlement of postrevolutionary Rhine
trade illustrates the dynamic throughwhich the aspiration to identify universal, cos-
mopolitan rights, which had been characteristic of the revolutionary movements,
migrated from the sphere of politics to the economy. Commercial, as opposed to po-
litical, universalism offered a new normative orientation for global capitalism. New
global institutions, such as the gold standard, opened the door to the exercise of new
kinds of power, and European states exploited those opportunities more success-
fully than any others in the nineteenth century. By focusing on the institutions that
created international legitimacy, we avoid a problem of circularity that identifies
modern economic growth with the particular pathways of individual European
states.13
Approaching the history of capitalism through its institutions empirically
grounds the aspiration to reconceptualize capitalism as a historically contingent
form of social totality.14 The firm is the most ubiquitous capitalist institution and
an excellent locus for its analysis.15 However, enterprises are enormously complex
and heterogeneous.16 MariannaMazzucato, Carlotta Perez, and scholars associated
with modern monetary theory argue that there are many instruments and insti-
tutions other than the firm through which the investment necessary for modern,
sustained economic growth can and have been delivered.17 Intergovernmental
organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary
12. Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2009).
13. Rosenthal and Wong point this out in their critique of North, Wallis, and Weingast’s work. Jean-
Laurent Rosenthal and Roy BinWong, Before and After Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and
Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 3; Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry
Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009); Istvan Hont, “Introduction,” in Jealousy of Trade: International Competition
and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 4–5. Acemoglu
and Robinson’s account of the same transition avoids circularity by asserting political determinants to eco-
nomic change. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and
Poverty (London, 2012).
14. Foundational work on historical institutionalism includes Coase, “The Nature of the Firm”; Wil-
liamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism; North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perfor-
mance, and Understanding the Process of Economic Change.
15. This is the approach taken by Jurgen Kocka, Capitalism: A Short History, trans. Jeremiah Riemer
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
16. Oliver E. Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” Journal of
Economic Literature 38 (2000): 595–613.
17. William Lazonick, “Innovative Enterprise and the Theory of the Firm,” in Rethinking Capitalism: Eco-
nomics and Policy for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, ed. Michael Jacobs and Mariana Mazzucato (Chiches-
ter: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 77–97.
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Fund, or the World Bank, on the other hand, rank among the most characteris-
tic and constitutive capitalist institutions.18 Established by treaty between sovereign
states, they are subject to international law and, crucially, have the ability to enter
into enforceable agreements among themselves, between themselves and states, and
to legislate for states.19 They govern the boundary between economy and politics and
have characteristics of both spheres. The capacity enjoyed by these institutions to
set the terms of activity for nations, corporations, development agencies, collectives,
and individuals hasmade them the focus of contemporary protest at capitalism’s dem-
ocratic deficit.20 Whatever views might be held about their efficacy or legitimacy,
these are clearly a set of capitalist institutions that share in a form of sovereignty and
so have constitutive capacity.
The Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine is the oldest continu-
ously existing intergovernmental organization (IGO).21 The commission was set
up throughArticles 108 to 116 of the “final act” of the Congress of Vienna and began
to function in June 1815.22 The commission has proved to be remarkably durable.
It has survived both world wars, having moved from its headquarters from Mainz
and then to Mannheim and finally to Strasbourg in 1920, and continues to ensure
the navigation of the Rhine and its associated waters. The organization of the Rhine
institutionalized at Vienna laid the template for open trade on international rivers
from that point forward. The Commission of the Danube, authorized by the Treaty
of Paris, was patterned on the Rhine Commission, and throughout the nineteenth
century the United States cited the Vienna principles in support of its claims to nav-
igation rights on SouthAmerican rivers. TheCongress of Berlin, in 1885, established
navigation rights on the Congo and the Niger on the same principles. The commis-
sion defined free trade and the nature of an international river through its practice,
and it exemplifies the capacity of IGOs to create economic rules that drive economic
life. However, the commission did not spring newly formed from the debates around
18. International society and its institutions have an enormous literature. See Robert O. Keohane,
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2004).
19. Josef L. Kunz, “Privileges and Immunities of International Organisations,” American Journal of In-
ternational Law 41, no. 4 (October 1947): 828–62.
20. See, among many others, Joel Spring, How Educational Ideologies Are Shaping Global Civil Society: In-
tergovernmental Organizations, NGOs, and the Decline of the Nation State (London: Routledge, 2004); David Held
and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007); Jason Beckfield, “The Dual World Polity: Fragmentation and Integration in
the Network of Intergovernmental Organisations,” Social Problems 55, no. 3 (2008): 419–42.
21. See Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, http://www.ccr-zkr.org.
22. Bob Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day (London:
Routledge, 2009), 28.
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the conservative reformation of Europe at Vienna; though an institution created by
the restored monarchies, the commission had revolutionary roots. Through the his-
tory of its formation, we can gain an insight into the process through which the re-
form impulses, and critiques of war and empire, of the late eighteenth centurywere
transformed and transmitted into the nineteenth.
THE RHINE BECOMES AN INLAND SEA: LEARNING CAPITALISM
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAY
The prehistory of the International Commission for the Rhine extends back into the
eighteenth century. The French statewould acquire responsibility for the regulation
of the Rhine, the artery of trade throughWestern Europe, as an unforeseen conse-
quence of the success of the revolutionary armies. However, the French state had
been grappling with the problem of identifying the legal principles that were rele-
vant to disputes over water resources for some time and continued to do so through
the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods.23 In 1788 the Conseil d’État, supported
by the silk weavers of Privas and Chomereau, had been highly frustrated that it
could not pursue its plan to relieve all duties on coal transported on French rivers.24
The Prince of Monaco and the Marquis de Veynes succeeded in having the courts
recognize that they had been awarded a tariff on the Rhône in 1719 in return for
ameliorating their existing rights on naval imports through Toulon and Marseilles.25
Thiswas exactly the kind of legal defense of privilege that disappeared after 1789. The
revolution marked a clear decision that rights of communication on French rivers
could not be hampered by any kind of preexisting legal claims. In 1804 the Tribunal
de Commerce of Lyon asked theMinistry of the Interior to suppress the unregulated
water traffic between Lyons, Châlons, and Paris that was competing with the road
haulers.26 Theminister absolutely refused to, taking the opportunity to explain that
“the government does not wish to limit their liberty in that way, nor to impose con-
ditions that they must use this route rather than another.”27 The Commission on
Public Works recommended that the Canal of Briare, along with the Canals of
23. See Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, The Fruits of Revolution: Property Rights, Litigation, and the French Agri-
culture, 1700–1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
24. Arrêt du Conseil d’État du Roi, qui fait défenses de percevoir aucun Droit de Péage dans l’étendue du
Royaume, sur le Charbon de Terre, qui ne se trouvera pas nommément exprimé dans les tariffs ou pancartes
(Paris, October 28, 1785).
25. Archives Nationales (hereafter AN) AN F12 1512b, Anon. to Contrôleur-Général de Finance, No-
vember 22, 1788.
26. AN F12 1515b, Anon., Aux magistrats composant le Tribunal de Commerce, à Lyon (Lyon, An XIII).
27. AN F12 1515b, Le Ministre de l’Intérieur aux commissaires chargeurs de Lyon, Genes, le 15
Messidor an XIII.
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Orleans and Loing, should be nationalized and put under a unified public autho-
rity.28 It did so although conceding that the owners of the canal had made every ef-
fort to maintain the waterway, even in the most difficult moments of the year II.
Even the most publicly spirited private owners could not be relied on to meet the
needs of the common good; “a wise, economic and thrifty owner will only make in-
vestments relative to the possible profits.” The creation of régie tomaintain and guar-
antee the public interest inwaterwayswas a popular solution; the Chamber of Com-
merce of Toulouse asked for an authority to control andmaintain the Canal duMidi
in 1805.29 Waterways were a productive site of schemes to align public good with
private interest through investment. In 1797 M. Gamot was the recipient of exten-
sive support from the Ministry of the Interior, including the offer of a dock for his
exclusive use in Paris, for his scheme to design seagoing vessels that would be capa-
ble of coming up the Seine from Le Havre.30 This particular vision of Paris becoming
directly connected to the seawas recurrent and resolutely commercial. An entrepre-
neur called Mioche rallied “our capitalists to co-operate in the construction of ships
adapted to the trade on the Seine” by pointing out that if the alternative scheme of a
canal from Dieppe to Paris was constructed then the trade of the river would col-
lapse.31 Rivers were a fecund source of creative thinking about the relationship of
trade to citizenship.
The Scheldt and subsequently the Rhine posed difficult challenges to public pol-
icy because they were international rivers. Organizing trade on canals or rivers
within France demanded the creation of new economic institutions for the nation;
it was a form of economic constitutionmaking. Articulating the conception of rights
underpinning a cosmopolitan right to trade on international rivers drove French
politicians, administrators, and merchants to ideas that were very far from the no-
tion of a political community giving the law to itself. The absorption of the nine new
departments on the left bank of theRhine onOctober 1, 1795, not only brought new
territories with complicated commercial histories into the republic, it also made the
republic responsible for the management of the Rhine, the most important water-
way in the Western Europe, from the borders of the Batavian Republic to the Alps.
Latterly even the mouth of the Rhine became a French responsibility when the
Netherlands became part of the French Empire.
28. AN F12 1515, Rapport de la commission de travaux publics au Comité du Salut Public, 9 germinal An III.
29. AN F12 1515, Les membres composant la Chambre de Commerce de Toulouse à son excéllence le
Ministre de l’Intérieur, 21 pluviose an 13.
30. AN D 1515, Rapport présenté au Ministre de l’intérieur, 9 prairial an V.
31. Mioche, Entreprise d’un cabotage de la mer par Le Havre et Rouen, jusqu’à Paris (Paris, an X), 2–3.
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Robert Mark Spaulding explains that the 1815 resolution of the problem of the
Rhine effectively rehearsed the Octroi agreement, signed between the French Re-
public and the German Empire on October 14, 1804.32 That agreement established
a unified set of tolls for three different categories of goods levied at 12 toll stations
along the river and abolished the privileges of Cologne andMainz that had required
the reshipment of all consignments at those two river ports. The subsequent growth
in internal riverine traffic, which drove economic development in the heart of Eu-
rope, dated from the Napoleonic period and continued into the nineteenth cen-
tury.33 Spaulding again has interrogated an array of data that establishes that, de-
spite the disruptions of war and blockade, riverine traffic on the Rhine increased
as institutional reform provoked intensified internal continental trade.34 The agree-
ment established the precedent that the revenues from the tolls should be assigned
to the maintenance of the riverway and so solved the endemic problem of underin-
vestment and rent extraction that had led to a slow decline in trade on the Rhine
during the eighteenth century. The new regimewas notwithout itsflaws; Ellis notes
that the discussions in the Strasbourg Chamber of Commerce during theNapoleonic
period were dominated by contention over the costs of repair to the river and the
rights of access enjoyed by Alsatian boatmen.35 However, there were no complaints
about the principle of the reform, and Alsatian merchants stopped looking for alter-
native routes to avoid tolls. Spaulding’s and Ellis’s accounts cohere with an emerg-
ing consensus among economic historians that the revolutionary and Napoleonic
institutional reforms were instrumental in creation of an expanded internal Euro-
pean market in the nineteenth century through lowered transport costs and a new,
shared set of economic rules.36
32. Robert Mark Spaulding, “Revolutionary France and the Transformation of the Rhine,” Central Eu-
ropean History 44 (2011): 203–26, and “Rhine River Commerce and the Continental System,” in Revisiting
Napoleon’s Continental System. War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850 (London: Routledge, 2015), 114–32.
33. Geoffrey Ellis, Napoleon’s Continental Blockade: The Case of Alsace (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1981); Michael Kopsidis, Ulrich Pfister, Frederike Scholten, and Johannes Bracht, “Agricultural Output
Growth in a Proto- and Early Industrial Setting: Evidence from Sharecropping in Western Westphalia
and the Lower Rhineland c1740–1860,”Rural History 28, no. 1 (2017): 21–46;Michael Rowe, “Between Em-
pire and Home Town: Napoleonic Rule on the Rhine, 1799–1814,”Historical Journal 2, no. 3 (1999): 643–74;
Roger Dufraisse, “Les organisations professionelles de la batallerie à Cologne: des tribus de l’ancien regime à
la guilde napoleonienne,” Actes du quatre-vingt douzième Congrès national des Sociétés savants, Strasbourg et Colmar
1967 (Section d’histoire modern et contemporaine), vol. 2: Le Commerce et l’industrie (Paris: Bibliothèque
nationale, 1970), 179–98.
34. Robert Mark Spaulding, “Changing Patterns of Rhine Commerce in the Era of French Hegemony,
1793–1813,” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschatesgeschichte 100, no. 4 (2013): 413–31.
35. Ellis, Napoleon’s Continental Blockade, 51, 73.
36. Kevin O’Rourke, “The Worldwide Economic Impact of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars, 1793–1815,” Journal of Global History 1 (2006): 123–49; Daron Acemoglu, Davide Cantoni, Simon
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The regulations of 1804 and the treaty of 1815 were compromises. Prussian and
other German negotiators attempted to restrict international access to the Rhine as
much as possible andwere anxious to protect the trade of their riparian cities.37 The
new regulations were successful because of the political support of Talleyrand and
the rest of the French delegation as well as the British negotiators. This should not
be surprising, as the freedom of the Rhine had been a consistent policy goal of rev-
olutionary France. The first initiative toward making the Rhine a free trade zone
was Article 19 of the treaty signedwith the United Provinces on 27 floréal an III that
gave navigation rights on the Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt, and Hondt to French and Bel-
gians.38 The FrenchRepublic gained control of the elements of the empire on the left
bank of the Rhine in the autumn of 1794, and this was recognized in the Peace of
Basel, signed with Prussia in April 1795.39 After the Treaty of Campo Formio, the
Directory began the organization of the territory into departments, and this brought
into sharp focus the problem of regulation of thewaterway of the Rhine. During the
abortive Congress of Rastadt in 1797–98, the French position was that there should
be an absolute right of navigation on the Rhine.40 The French vision of the Rhine,
and the other rivers of the Low Countries, as a free trade zone was remarkably con-
sistent. The 1804 regulations, therefore, did not articulate the commercial vision of
the republic, or even of the Napoleonic regime, but reflected a pragmatic compro-
mise with the German states, a tactical withdrawal from the preferred ideal. The
more radical capitalist norms inscribed into the foundations of the Commission of
the Rhine were inherited from the experience of the French revolutionary state
and were even more capacious in their claims.
This kind of continuity across the revolutionary decades is unusual. To under-
stand why the French revolutionary state was so committed to an open Rhine,
and the later Napoleonic regime remained so, we have to understand the moment
in the revolutionary decades that the right to trade on Europe’s rivers became po-
litically important. That moment was the autumn of 1792, when the French armies
took control of the Scheldt, the most politically controversial river in Western Eu-
rope. The fall of the French monarchy in August 1792 radicalized arguments about
Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution,” Amer-
ican Economic Review 101 (December 2011): 3286–307.
37. Georges Kaekenbeeck, International Rivers: A Monograph Based on Diplomatic Documents, Grotius So-
ciety Publications, no. 1 (New York: Grotius Society, 1919), 40–45.
38. Gazette National de France, No. 246, 6 prairial an III. The Hond (or Hondt) is also known as the West-
ern Scheldt.
39. Philippe Sagnac, Le Rhin Français pendant la Révolution et l’Empire (Paris: Alcan, 1917), 115–16.
40. Kaekenbeeck, International Rivers, 33.
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natural right that had characterized the Revolution since 1789 and drove its political
trajectory toward new experiments.41 The dawning realization that a just society
could not be found and ordered by the ascription of rights to existing social and eco-
nomic relationships, but would have to be made, created the conditions for pro-
found conflict among revolutionaries. Seemingly secure institutions that created
the context for the practice of rights, such as property or the family, themselves be-
came vulnerable to political scrutiny.42 Previously unimaginable reforms, such as
the institution of no-fault divorce or the complete overturn of the colonial economy
through the abolition of slavery, became politically credible as the possibilities of
rights-bearing citizenship became unmoored from existing social institutions.43
The history of the republic from 1792 to 1794 was dominated by conflict, primarily
betweenMontagnards, Girondins, and Sans-Culottes, that turned onwhatmodel of
citizenship, adapted to various visions of commercial society, would be used to give
depth andmeaning to the regime of natural right. That conflict had outcomes as var-
ious as the full acceptance of Jews into civil life, the proclamation of a universal right
to education, and the institution of Terror.
At the precise moment in 1792 that the “second revolution” commenced, the
successes of French armies forced the French executive to confront the problems
of a revolutionary army becoming an army of occupation. The invasion of the Aus-
trian Netherlands by Dumouriez in October 1792, and victory at Jemappes in No-
vember, made one of the most politically troubled regions of Europe, and one that
had its own complex history of revolutionary and reform politics, the responsibility
of the new French Republic.44 In the brief period between November 1792 and
March 1793, when after the defeat at Neerwinden the French armies had to retreat
south, the French Republic had to work out how the rights of peoples, the rights
of man, and the right to trade could be sustained by an occupying power.45 The
41. For contrasting treatments of natural right in the Revolution, see Florence Gauthier, ed., Triomphe
et mort du droit naturel en Révolution 1789–1795–1802 (Paris: Editions Syllepse, 1992); Marc Belissa, Yannick
Bosc, and Florence Gauthier, eds., Républicanismes et droit naturel. Des Humanites aux revolutions des droits de
l’homme et du citoyen (Paris: Editions Kimé, 2009); Dan Edelstein, The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism,
the Cult of Nature, and the French Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
42. Rafe Blaufarb, The Great Demarcation: The French Revolution and the Invention of Modern Property
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); SuzanneDesan, The Family on Trial in Revolutionary France (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 2004).
43. Of course, all innovations quoted existing institutions. On the overthrow of colonial slavery, see
Malick Ghachem, The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
44. On this complexity, see Klaas Van Gelder, “The Convention of The Hague and the Constitutional
Debates in the Estates of Flanders and Brabant,” Early Modern Low Countries 1 (2017): 156–76.
45. Marc Belissa, Fraternité universelle et intérêt national (1713–1795): Les cosmopolitiques du droit des gens
(Paris: Editions Kimé, 1998).
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solution it found to the problem of Belgium’s rivers would determine the commer-
cial principles of the emerging republic.46
Belgium had been a cockpit within which issues of international political econ-
omyhad been played out since themiddle of the seventeenth century.47 In 1648 the
Treaty of Westphalia had closed the Scheldt and so cut Antwerp out of competition
with Amsterdam for a dominant role in the newly emerging Atlantic trade. Again in
1731 the Treaty of Vienna explicitly excluded the Low Countries from the Asian
trade and closed the Ostend Company, which had been a rallying point for enemies
of the British East India Company. In 1784 the Austrian emperor Joseph II had at-
tempted to establish a right of navigation on the Scheldt but had not been supported
by his French allies.48 Core principles of international order were at stake in the
question of the Scheldt. Was revolutionary France going to accept the binding force
of antecedent international treaties as so respect the closing of the Scheldt, or would
it appeal to Grotian principles such as the right to trade, and open it?
War complicated the issue: it was not clear how armed democracy was compat-
ible with natural right, and the army had its own problems that constrained the ca-
pacity of the state to control it. In November 1792, even as it invaded the country,
the French armywas on the point of collapse and likely to pose a danger to the local
population if unpaid. On November 21 the paymaster of Dumouriez’s army wrote
from Valenciennes that money was so short that “it will be impossible for me to
continue payment.”49 Unpaid invading armies were not exemplars of citizenship,
even in regions such as Liège that were generally more sympathetic to French ide-
als. The problem continued to occupy the attention of the French authorities. In the
year III the commissaire, Robert, had to remind the troops that the Liègeoiswere allies
and friends and should be protected from soldiers “breaking down hedges, stealing
vegetables and tramping down the coming harvest.”50 On the other hand, the effi-
cacy of the new revolutionary regimewas highly dependent on the educative effect
of armed men. The same Robert notified the municipality of Liège that if “the cold
avarice or anti-civic resistance of well-off individuals” and their lack of enthusiasm
for the forced loan continued, then he would use the army to seize their goods.51
46. Belgium is of course a geographical term in 1792, though it was used by the French authorities. The
Austrian Netherlands (Flanders, Brabant, Hainaut, and Namur) and the bishopric of Liège were the rele-
vant political entities, but the region constituted nine provinces in total.
47. Stanley T. Bindoff, The Scheldt Question to 1839 (London: Routledge, 1945).
48. Munro Price, “The Dutch Affair and the Fall of the Ancien Régime, 1784–1787,” Historical Journal
38, no. 4 (1995): 878.
49. AN D2/1, Lemonnier to the Conseil exeécutif provisoire, Valenciennes, November 21, 1792.
50. AN F1e 2, Proclamation au nom du peuple français, 2 prairial an II.
51. AN F1e 2, Robert to the Commune of Liège, 8 prairial an III.
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Howwas the French Republic that preemptively invaded states beyond its “natural
limits” different from any other commercial empire? Did the republic simply repro-
duce the cycle of appropriating the profits of commerce to fuel war?
The Conseil exécutif provisoire of the newly established French Republic sat
down to confront these tangled problems of war, international order, and economy
on themorning of November 16, 1792.52 The executive council had been created by
the Legislative Assembly on August 13 and would remain the effective government
until the creation of the Committee of Public Safety inApril 1793.53 It was dominated
bymen, such as Roland and Clavière, who had been intellectually and practically en-
gagedwith problemsof politics and commerce fromwell before theRevolution.54As a
first pieceof business theyhad to address the strategic situationof the armies, and they
found themselves with no other option but to escalate the war. If they allowed the
forces of the coalition to retreat and regroup in safety that would leave the republic
vulnerable and on the defensive. In response to this problem, they gave orders to Du-
mouriez “to pursue theenemyarmies, even intoDutch territory, if they should retreat
in that direction.”55 The republic could not escape theHobbesian logic of international
conflict.
The members of the council were disturbed by the inability of the revolutionary
regime to act in accordance within its declared cosmopolitan principles and were
anxious to rescue them. One of the members pointed out that “the restrictions
and shackles which up to now the commerce and navigation of the Escaut [Scheldt]
and the Meuse have suffered, are directly contrary to the fundamental principles of
natural rights which all French people have sworn to uphold.”56 This opened up a
beautiful opportunity tomake sure that “all the nations of Europewill not be able to
deny that the destruction of all tyrannies and the triumph of the rights of man are
the only ambitions of the French people.”57 They demanded that the Scheldt be im-
mediately opened to commerce.
52. AN AF II* 1, Registre des délibérations du Conseil exécutif provisoire, Soixante-Cinquième Séance,
November 16, 1792.
53. AN AFII 2 f.5, Première séance du Conseil exécutif provisoire, 13 août 1792, l’an II de la liberté.
54. Unfortunately, the procès-verbal of the discussion does not identify individual speakers.
55. AN AF II* 1, Registre des délibérations du Conseil exécutif provisoire, Soixante-Cinquième Séance,
November 16, 1792.
56. AN AF II* 1, Registre des délibérations du Conseil exécutif provisoire, Soixante-Cinquième Séance,
November 16, 1792. “gênes et les entraves que jusqu’au présent la navigation et le commerce ont souffert
tant sur l’Escaut que sur laMeuse sont directement contraires aux principes fondamentaux du droit naturel
que tous les français ont juré de maintenir.”
57. AN AF II* 1, Registre des délibérations du Conseil exécutif provisoire, Soixante-Cinquième Séance,
November 16, 1792.
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The terms under which the council instructed Dumouriez to open the Scheldt to
commerce were fascinating because they distinguished between the natural rights
of citizens and a set of commercial, cosmopolitan natural rights. The council did not
declare its support for a decision the people of Antwerp or Brabant might take to
seek to have the Scheldt opened, which would be a political process, but argued
that the opening of the Scheldt was a duty, “liberty restored and tyranny over-
turned.” The council was specific that rights were inherent in international rivers
outside the will of any particular people who lived on their banks:
The path of a river is the common and inalienable property of the people (ha-
bitans) of all the countries watered by its flow. No nation can, without injustice,
claim the right to prevent the neighbouring peoples who live on the upper
reaches from enjoying the same advantages. Any such right is a vestige of feu-
dal servitudes or otherwise anodiousmonopoly,which could only be instituted
by force, and consented to from a position of weakness, and is in consequence
revocable in any circumstance and despite any treaties.58
The rights inherent in the Scheldt, and by extension all international rivers, were
not political in nature; rather, they were prepolitical, cosmopolitan regulative prin-
ciples, beyond and immune to political process.
It is unusual for a policy to be explicitly articulated in terms of first principles.
This should not blind us to the pragmatic work that opening the Scheldt also
achieved. Opening the Scheldt would force the Dutch either to acquiesce to the ab-
rogation of international treaties that were foundational to their state or fire on
shipsmoving through the Scheldt delta from theWalcheren andCadzand forts, thus
supplying the French Republic with a casus belli. Moving responsibility for hostility
to the Dutch was an astute piece of politics. However, the pragmatic politics did not
exhaust the meaning of the action. Effectively, the republic had identified a form of
economic liberty that an individual or population could enjoy without themselves
enjoying political liberty. This was made clear in the final comment of the council
that “when the advantages already gained for the Belgian people by French arms
are united with the free navigation of the rivers and the freedom of commerce
for the provinces, this people will no longer have any fears for their indepen-
dence.”59 Belgians could enjoy their natural rights even without being sovereign.
The same language was used in the festival held at Antwerp by the French army
and the municipality to celebrate the actual opening of the Scheldt—as opposed
to the original declaration—the following year, after the French military position
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
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had been reasserted.60 The French victories were not celebrated for having freed
the Belgian nation but because the “benefits they brought to humanity” had been
established in the unshakable foundations of “public property and the impres-
criptible rights of Nature.”61 In their response, the municipality echoed the same
idea, that “the liberty of commerce loudly proclaimed by the Convention nationale
and proclaimed by its representatives, is a sacred act, a formal obligation,” not a po-
litical decision, an act of sovereignty.62 The political moment around the opening of
the Scheldt created the opportunity for the principles of natural right to find expres-
sion in commerce rather than through the sovereign nation.
The narrative through which the improvisation aligning revolutionary natural
right with liberty of commerce in 1792 develops into the institution of the Commis-
sion of the Rhine in 1815 is long and complicated. Because the decision to open the
Scheldt reflected the ideological problems the revolutionaries were facing rather
than any local demand, the initial response on the ground was at best lukewarm.
In the note to the Committee of Public Safety, appended to the account of the fes-
tival celebrating the opening of the Scheldt, Fabre admitted that the measure was
not popular, “fanaticism and other prejudices among the people of Antwerp had
stopped them from responding to this great humanitarian act with all the feeling
one might hope.”63 Commercial liberty was not making citizens of Belgians. Com-
merce did have its own logic, however; even though political opinion did not sup-
port the French, the prospect that unrestricted commercewould drive an increase in
trade had pushed up the property market in Ostend, where “public spirit is bad and
the opening of the Scheldt has not improved it.”64 Even where the French had sup-
port, problems could arise. The commissaire at Liège had to balance the need to sus-
tain the support of the revolutionaries of Liège,whowere notablymore enthusiastic
about the French occupation than inhabitants in the other provinces of the Low
Countries, with the ambition of the Thermidorian regime to end political conflict.
He imposed a jury on the revolutionary tribunal in the name of “justice, which
has descended among the peoples to render themhappy and sustain their respective
rights of the person and property.”65 The rights of person and property, commercial
60. Anon., Procès-verbal de l’ouverature del’Escaut, don’t la liberté à été proclamé par la République française, le
30 Thermidor, jour de la celebration de l’imortelle journée du 10 Août 1792 (Antwerp, An II).
61. Ibid., 2.
62. Ibid., 8.
63. AN F1e7, Fabre de Nantes, repésentant de peuple près des armées du Nord et du Sambre et Meuse,
au Comité du Salut Public, Bruxelles, 5 fructidor an III.
64. AN F1e3, “Notes sur l’Ostende pays reunis par le décret du 9 vendemiare,” 15 fructidor an III.
65. AN F1e1, Robert, au citoyen accusateur public près le Tribunal criminal révolutionnaire établi à Li-
ège, Liège, 26 floréal an III.
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liberty, did not satisfy critics of the Revolution or its supporters. Moreover, the con-
troversies around the French East India Company, implicated in bribery and share
fixing at precisely the moment that the republic embraced freedom of international
commerce, made the boundary between international commerce and politics a
tense one.66 The role of trade in a republic would divide Gironde fromMontagnard.
Despite these complications, the idea of the liberty of commerce as a natural right
had two distinctive outcomes for economic organization in Belgium. During the
moment of revolutionary government, up to the summer of 1794, the liberty of
commerce was understood as a regulative principle, hostile to established or local
preferences, which were understood as forms of privilege. The actions of the Com-
mittee of Public Safety and its improvisation of a war economy interpreted the free-
dom of commerce in a particularly clear and unambiguous way. Faced with a prob-
lem of food supply, for instance, on 27 thermidor an III the Committee of Public
Safety had allowed goods to transit through the old Belgium on their way to Swit-
zerland without paying customs, effectively allowing the free navigation of the
Meuse and the Rhine.67 That was only one of a suite of measures, such as lowering
the duty on imported gin, instituted by the répresentant en mission Lefebvre to stim-
ulate the economy and support the armies. However, the historic memory of these
measures in Belgium was not of having been forced to be economically free but as
the imposition of political control on commerce. In the immediate aftermath of the
revolutionary government, when an official in the canton of Gand wanted to sup-
port the petition of local cloth manufacturers to allow export of thread abroad he
cited the interference of the répresentants en mission as the paradigm of ill-informed
interference with the liberty that was the real interest of the republic. The com-
missaire unwittingly cited the principles of natural right that animated exactly the
behavior he was denouncing. He defined liberty as economic liberty: “The general
interest of the citizens, that is to say that of the nation, exists only in the liberty of
commerce and agriculture.”68 The revolutionary experience decisively altered the
terms through which economic experience was conceptualized, but the change was
so rapid and profound that different interests did not align to new ideas in a consis-
tent pattern.
The administrative and legal work that was being done through the debate on
Belgian commercewas to open a spacewhere the political categories of republicanism,
66. Elizabeth Cross, “L’anatomie d’un scandale: L’affaire de la Compagnie des Indes revistée (1793–
1794),” in Vertu et politique: les pratiques des législateurs, ed. Michel Biard et al. (Rennes: Presses Universitaires
de Rennes, 2015), 251–64.
67. F12 606 23, Ventose an 6.
68. AN F12 607, Le commissaire du directoire exécutif près le Tribunal correctionnel du Canton de
Gand au Citoyen Ministre de l’Intérieur, 1 prairial an IV.
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which unified all activity into a substantive idea of the public good, simply did not
hold. The idea of virtue, which had taken the independent judgment of the citizen as
its norm that was pursued by the public good, was being replaced by an idea of rights,
understood commercially. In the year VIII a group of entrepreneurs in Tournai got to-
gether to form an association for the exploitation of chaux (lime). This associationwas
nearly immediately declared a corporation, and so illegal, by the prefect.69 The entre-
preneurs appealed to the Ministry of the Interior against this decision, and they were
supported.What the officials in the central state ruledwas that the lawwas effectively
silent about this kind of economic association.What is particularly interesting is that
inmaking this decision the head of the fourth section defined the characteristics of a
corporation in a particularly tight way to exclude the new association from the pro-
visions of the Le Chapelier law. To be considered illegal, organizations
1. must include all the practitioners, in this case all the chaufourniers;
2. have to regulate the methods of production and the rates of sale;
3. have to appoint their own officials to control the activity; and
4. have to be capable of pursuing individuals breaking their regulations in
law.70
The law was effectively silent, and political considerations did not apply, to any as-
sociation that did not fulfill these criteria, which of course opened up a wide scope
for forms of organization. The important work of Erika Vause illuminates how the
seemingly simple division of politics and economy became complicated even around
matters like imprisonment, which would seem to sit squarely within the orbit of sov-
ereign power.71
Even in sectors that the Belgian economy was strong, its organization posed
problems. In an industrial survey of the department of the Ourthe conducted in
the year V (1796–97) the correspondent reminded the ministry that the strength
of the cloth industry around Liège, which at that point was exporting more than
30,000 pieces of cloth every year, depended on access to European and Mediterra-
nean markets: “Its well-being and progress depend on the liberty of commerce in
Europe.”72 A similar report, this time written by the chamber of commerce at
Bruges for the foreign minister, made the same point and underlined the threat
69. AN F12 607, Extrait du registre de la arrêté de la préfeture du département de Jemmappes, 23
prairial an 8.
70. AN F12 607, Rapport présenté au Ministre de l’Intérieur, 7 Germinal an 9.
71. Erika Vause, “Disciplining the Market: Debt Imprisonment, Public Credit, and the Construction of
Commercial Personhood in Revolutionary France,” Law and History Review 32, no. 3 (2014): 647–82.
72. AN F12 607, Note sommaire sur le commerce du Département de l’Ourthe avant la guerre,
24 nivose an 5.
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to the commerce of Bruges from the war. Holding on to access to Spanish markets
was vital if the cloth industry was to survive, and the same was true of Germany in
the case of the sugar refineries.73 That these facts of international commercewere in
tension with the strategic goals of the French state was unremarkable. What was
more telling was the appeal to the “liberty of commerce in Europe” as the criterion
that should guide decision making.
As one would expect, the reactions to the effort to order the internal commerce
of this immense river system under a principle of free navigation were as various
as the interests of towns and cities along it. Cities that had been excluded from the
profits of Rhine tolls, and had their own merchants subjected to them, were anxious
for all tolls to be lifted. “The different tolls imposed by fraud on the rivers of the re-
gion with which theMoselle connects, have blocked the citizens of Metz from com-
mitting themselves to commercial pursuits,” which they looked forward to taking
up.74 On the other hand, the territories that derived an income from the river, and
particularly the cities of Cologne and Mainz where all goods had to be reassigned to
local boatmen, struggled to defend their privileges. In 1802 the administrator of the
duchy of Berg complained that the Cologne authorities were abusing the power
they had been given to continue to inspect all goods coming up the river and to ex-
clude all English goods. He asserted they were deliberately making it impossible to
move goods fromDüsseldorf to Frankfurt, “which creates an obstacle to the free nav-
igation of the Rhine.”75 Colognewould continue to agitate to recover its old privileges
right through the Napoleonic period, petitioning as late as 1812 to have the privilege
of the boatmen restored and local, rather than commission, control of commerce.76
Despite these contending political claims, the state consistently adhered to the princi-
ple of freedom of commerce.
The accession of Napoleon and the construction of the Continental System ac-
centuated the importance of the Rhine.77 The commitment to the natural right to
tradewas tested by some complicated cases.78 In January 1807 sevenAmerican ships,
73. AN F12 607, Les chef et députés de la chambre de commerce à Bruges au citoyen Charles Delacroix,
Ministre des relations extérieurs, Bruges, 30 nivôse an 5.
74. AN F12 1515, Extrait des registres des délibérations du Directoire du district de Metz, 17 thermidor
An III.
75. AN F12 608, La Régence du Pays de Berg au Citoyen Jeanbon Saint André, Commissaire general
des départements réunis, Dusseldorf, April 3, 1802.
76. AN F12 608, Chambre de Commerce de Cologne à son excellence le Ministre de Commerce et des
Manufactures, Cologne, May 21, 1812.
77. François Crouzet, “Wars, Blockade and Economic Change in Europe, 1792–1815,” Journal of Eco-
nomic History 24 (1964): 587. Geoffrey Ellis persuasively argued that the Continental System used markets
in a form of “imperial preference.” Ellis, Napoleon’s Continental Blockade.
78. AN F12 608, Navires américaines, Anvers, 1807–10.
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acting for the New York merchants Parrish and Ridgeway, deposited goods in Ant-
werp having previously called at England. What they were unaware of was that the
decree of December 21, 1806, promulgated while they were en route, banned all ships
having had contact with England from continental ports. The goods were initially not a
problem because they were all of American origin and thus neutral: cotton, sarsapa-
rilla, and indigo. However, the ships were insured in London, with Barings, and the
merchants who had sent the goods had accounts to clear in London and Liverpool.
The profits of the sale in Antwerp were to be used, at least in part, to clear those
debts. The Americans explained that most of the trade between the United States and
Europe had this structure, and if there were to be neutral commerce it would have to
be insured in this way. Despite the fact that the profits of the sale were to be paid to
British correspondents, they were eventually, in 1810, allowed to remit the money.
Through governance of the Rhine, the French state became cognizant that its
commitment to free trade had effectively created a new principle of international
commerce. An anonymous memorandum explained to ministers the reason why
“it was necessary to have the sovereign princes of the right bank renounce their
right to participate directly in the administration of the river, and to restrict the local
French authorities in the sameway.”79 Only then could a “central commission” en-
sure the “salutary effects of a common policy.” The same anonymous fonctionnaire
wrote lyrically about the positive effects of the transfer of power to the commission,
whichmade the Rhinemore like a sea than a river “serving as the intermediary that
allows the national merchant fleet, without foreign intervention, to carry the prod-
ucts of the happy soil of France and the industrie of its inhabitants to themost distant
countries.”80 The state exemplified and supported natural right by extending the
means of commerce. The memorandum suggested that the policy of the French state
should not be to return the river to local control but to extend the inland sea
through canals linking the Rhine, the Rhône, and the Elbe. Of course, extending
the river system would extend the competence of the commission and the remit of
natural rights.
Among major political figures few had the sensitivity and insight shown by this
administrator, but Talleyrand was particularly alive to the political importance of
the articulation of natural right as the right to trade. He saw the possibility of using
that intuition of natural right as an organizing principle for the international order,
79. AN F12 608, Considérations sur le traité du 27 thermidor an 12e (15 août 1804) connu sous le nom
de la convention de l’octroi de la navigation du Rhin, n.d.
80. Ibid.
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one that would be in French interests.81 In a long report he wrote analyzing the po-
sition of the republic in global affairs, Talleyrand argued that France should aggres-
sively assert the trading rights of neutrals.82 His strategic goal was the isolation of
Britain, but he argued this was best achieved not by embargo but by making France
guarantor of the right to trade. In his comments on the situation of Denmark, he
argued that the armed neutrality in this war was not like that in the American,
because this one was effectively guaranteed by France, did not have Russia in it,
and had not been respected by all parties. England had declared all commerce to
French ports contraband and stopped neutral vessels indiscriminately, thus defying
the law of the sea. He argued France had played its hand badly.Worried about food,
France had commissioned and paid for cargoes, which then had been taken up by
the English, and the weak protests of the Swedes and Danes showed how little they
cared. France should have made the freedom of the seas a war principle and pro-
voked the Danes and Swedes to join her, not just effectively subsidized the British.
New laws trying to strangle British trade had achieved nothing other than provok-
ing the neutrals; better laws would reorder trade around France and make it the
heart of a free trade empire. Ironically, this predicted how British policy would
evolve.83
The institutional design and regulatory power of the Central Commission for the
Navigation of the Rhine reflected the experience of revolutionary and Napoleonic
France. It also recapitulated the reform aspirations of the British delegation to the
Congress of Vienna, and in particular those of the Anglo-Irish negotiators Castle-
reagh and Clancarty.84 Castlereagh, thought the architect of conservative retrench-
ment in the aftermath of the revolution, had made his first forays into politics as
the reforming Whig Robert Stewart, arguing for free trade for Ireland within the
British Empire.85 Stewart had been a commercial radical in his youth, warning
his father-in-law Lord Camden in 1779 that any effort to introduce a tea export duty
81. For similar debates in the United States, see Mlada Bukanovsky, “American Identity and Neutral
Rights from Independence to the War of 1812,” International Organization 51, no. 2 (1997): 209–43.
82. Beinecke Library LaRévellière-Lépeaux Papers, MSS 549 f89, Rapport au Directoire exécutif sur la
situation de la République française considérée dans ses rapports extérieurs avec les autres puissances, 14
messidor an VI.
83. Bernard Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade
and Imperialism, 1750–1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Sudipta Sen, Empire of Free
Trade: The East India Company and the Making of the Colonial Marketplace (Philadelphia: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 1998).
84. Richard Le Poer Trench, Second Earl of Clancarty (1767–1805); Robert Stewart, Viscount Castle-
reagh and Second Marquess of Londonderry (1769–1822).
85. Centre for Kentish Studies, CamdenManuscripts, U840/c/173/92, Lord Camden to Robert Stewart,
Camden Place, August 25, 1785.
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to Ireland “would havemade the samemischief here” as in America.86 His commer-
cial cosmopolitanism survived his conservative evolution and paralleled the evolu-
tion of French thinking. However, we should not mistake agency for structure. The
creation of a new kind of institution of governance at Vienna was not a matter of
agreement between Talleyrand and Castlereagh but was of a piece with similar in-
stitutional innovations in a variety of contexts. In Britain, eighteenth-century ac-
counting standards, especially for public accounts, had been very difficult to stabilize
and highly politicized. The Commission of Accounts had been an intermittent in-
strument of parliamentary investigation, most notably used as a factional weapon
in the “rage of parties.”87 When Pitt the Younger decided to use a commission of
accounts as an instrument of fiscal reform in 1785, he was working completely
within the accepted political rules of the game; what he could not have anticipated
was that by 1832 the commission he had initiatedwould have enunciated new pub-
lic accounts standards that moved the issue of corruption outside the political
realm.88 The revolutionary experience transformed a political instrument into an
instrument of economic regulation. That process of rule formation was reflected in-
ternationally in the emergence of new theories of accounts that translated older
rulesof thumb intouniversal regulatoryprinciples.89Public creditnetworks stretched
out to old empires and newly independent ex-colonies alike, imposing new dis-
ciplines and transforming politics.90 In the United States the Marshall Court was
moving in a cognate direction, identifying a series of extrapolitical rights at the core
of citizenship and creating the conditions for the establishment of the court as the de-
fender of property.91 A new form of regulatory governance, and a set of institutions,
was emerging that exerted constitutive power by reference to rules, sometimes
86. Centre for Kentish Studies, Camden Manuscripts, U840/c/492/5, Robert Stewart to Lord Camden,
Dublin, November 27, 1779.
87. Aaron Graham, “Auditing Leviathan: Corruption and State Formation in Early Eighteenth-Century
Britain,” English Historical Review 128, no. 533 (2013): 806–38.
88. Jacob Soll, The Reckoning: Financial Accountability and the Rise and Fall of Nations (New York: Basic
Books, 2014), 128.
89. Robert Mattessich, “Accounting Research and Researchers of the Nineteenth Century and the Be-
ginning of the Twentieth Century: An International Survey of Authors, Ideas and Publications,” Accounting,
Business and Financial History 13, no. 2 (2003): 125–70.
90. William Summerhill, Inglorious Revolution: Political Institutions, Sovereign Debt, and Financial Underde-
velopment in Imperial Brazil (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015); Catalina Vizcarra, “Guano, Cred-
ible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment in Nineteenth-Century Peru,” Journal of Economic His-
tory 69, no. 2 (2009): 358–87; Mark Dinecco, “The Political Economy of Fiscal Prudence in Historical
Perspective,” Economics and Politics 22, no. 1 (2010): 1–36.
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Michael J. Klarman, “HowGreatWere the ‘Great’Marshall Court Decisions?,” Virginia Law Review 87, no. 6
(2001): 1111–84.
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through states, sometimes through courts, and sometimes through international
organizations.
COMMERCIAL SOCIETY TO GLOBAL CAPITALISM
The particular resolution to the revolutionary crisis of the late eighteenth century
that linked sovereignty and improvement through capital was unforeseen and a re-
sult of the failure of every alternative vision of the future, from the grandest visions
of universal democracy and the extirpation of poverty to themore conservative uto-
pian dream of setting up a rural idyll on the Ohio.92 Capitalism, this article suggests,
is best understood in the terms offered by Fernand Braudel as analytically distinct
from commerce, markets, industry, or any of the other elements of economic life
that occur across a variety of forms of social organization. The peculiarity of capital-
ism as it emerged in the early nineteenth century is that its international institutions
incorporated a genuinely cosmopolitan commercial vision of the subject. The regu-
latory role of the IGOs, and in other contexts states and courts, enjoyed tremendous
legitimacy because they encapsulated an understanding of universal rights.93 If we
understand and approach the history of capitalism through these institutions we
can simultaneously capture its historical contingency and its world-shaping power.
That optic allows us to see themutual interactions of democracy, economy, and cap-
italism. The Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine is by nomeans the
most powerful or important of those institutions, but as the first it illuminates the
regulatory potential of capitalism with particular clarity.
The global nature and universal claims of nineteenth-century capitalism differ-
entiate it radically from the commercial societies of the eighteenth century. These,
of course, had substantial capitalist elements, but economic order was embedded in
conditions of public power (politics), social reproduction (domos), and nature.94 Cap-
italists were familiar and well-understood figures, noted in the classic Aventures de
92. Gareth Stedman Jones, “An End of Poverty: The French Revolution and the Promise of a World
without Want,” Historical Research 78, no. 200 (May 2005): 193–207, and An End to Poverty: A Historical
Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Suzanne Desan, “Transatlantic Spaces of Revolution:
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505.
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2015).
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Télémaque and defined in the Dictionnaire Domestique of 1765 as “celui qui fait valoir
son argent, en le disposant suivant le cour de la place, et qui vit de ses rentes” (one that in-
creases his money, by disposing of it according to price trends, and who lives from
his investments).95 However, the rent-drawing capitalist was the antithesis of the
communicating trader, the place, the exchange, a very different space to the marché.
Markets in commercial societies, as embedded zones of exchange within worlds of
shared value, were very different from the opaque world of long-distance traders
and bankers, and even these were subject to strategies of domestication in all com-
mercial societies. For an eighteenth-century town-dweller, a capitalistmarketwould
have been an oxymoron.96 The experience of a new kind of world, where ideas of
universal right were now expressed in economic terms, was so counterintuitive that
itwas only slowly recognized.Within political economy, themodern republican idea
that a world of reformed commercial states could provide the antidote to war and
empirewas only slowly transformed into a newkindof liberalism, one thatwas com-
patible with previously unimaginable forms of empire.97 In contrast to commercial
society, which was an explicitly theorized object, capitalism was a concept coined
only in the middle of the nineteenth century.98
This article argues that the change that opened the door to a capitalist world, one
dominated by capitalist norms, was the alteration to the boundary between eco-
nomic and public power that followed the era of the democratic revolution and
in particular the French Revolution. The idea of the economy as a separate order
had emerged in the seventeenth century, but it was only one of several competing
visions of the moral horizon of the subject. Capitalism as a world order became
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portative (Paris: Vincent, 1765), 3:505.
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354–61.
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Press, 2002), 275–92.
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possible when the boundary, the category of natural right, became filled by a com-
mercial universalism. This was the mechanism through which all that was solid
could be turned into air. The institutions that governed that boundary, and the
norms that animated them, are crucial to an understanding ofwhy industrial society
became indistinguishable from capitalist world order and how capitalism reconciled
itself to a form of democratic cosmopolitanism. The ambition of the article is em-
phatically not to offer a new view on the processes of industrialization and global-
ization but rather to help to explain the inflection of those complex processes to-
ward global capitalism. Capitalism is intertwined with modern economic growth
in such a complex pattern that it is almost impossible to distinguish them, but the
two remain analytically distinct, and a more sharply defined understanding of cap-
italism will aid in understanding both.
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